题目：可能与潜在世界的逻辑（Logics with actual and potential worlds）

报告人：丁一峰（北京大学哲学系助理教授）

时间：2025年11月20日9:00-11:00

主持人：王一廷（西南大学逻辑与智能研究中心 博士后）

地点：国家治理学院（三教）3203多媒体厅

摘要：Given the totality of the actual world, it is easy to accept that there is a maximally specific true proposition that completely describes the actual world to every detail. To be true is to be entailed by this maximally specific true proposition. 

It is also a common locution that to be possible is to be true at a possible world. Does this mean that to be possible is to be entailed by a maximally specific and possibly true proposition? We sketch a metaphysical picture where the only maximally specific proposition is the one made available by the totality of the actual world. 

Non-actual possible worlds are not “out there”, and there aren’t expressive resources to describe them in full detail; they are merely potential, even descriptively speaking. We also present the resulting logic of this picture, phrased in two languages: one with propositional contingentism and one with nominals.

报告人简介：丁一峰，加州大学伯克利分校逻辑与科学方法论博士，北京大学哲学系助理教授，主要研究兴趣为模态逻辑和社会选择理论，近期工作关注具有命题量词的模态逻辑、非正规模态逻辑、以及投票方法的公理化刻画定理。