报  告  人：Yang Liu 刘洋（剑桥大学哲学系）

报告题目：Two Tales of Epistemic Models

报告地点：西南大学逻辑与智能研究中心学术报告厅（3203）

时       间：2019年11月14日（星期四）14:30-16:30

报告摘要：

In this talk I will discuss some surprises and puzzles in epistemic models. First, I will prove a generalisation of Aumann's surprising impossibility result in the context of rational decision making. I then will move, in the second part, to discuss the interpretational meaning of some formal setups of epistemic models, and I will do so by means of presenting an interesting puzzle in epistemic logic. The aim is to highlight certain problematic aspects of these epistemic systems concerning first/third-person asymmetry which underlies both parts of the story. This asymmetry, I argue, reveals certain limits of what epistemic models can be.

报告人简介：

美国哥伦比亚大学哲学博士。现执教于英国剑桥大学哲学系，任该系长聘研究员，并兼任剑桥大学未来智能中心研究员。研究领域包括逻辑学，概率论基础，决策论，以及人工智能的哲学基础。目前的研究受利文休姆基金会和艾萨克·牛顿基金会慷慨资助。

报告现场照片：